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Introduction 
This essay examines how to design intergovernmental equalisation transfers (IET) 
for two cases. The first is the case of Indian states where we examine how the use of 
imperfect data can efficiently approximate first-best measures of fiscal capacity and 
optimal IET schemes.  The second is the case of Kosovo where we will simulate an IET 
scheme using property tax  data.  
 
The purpose of the first part of this paper is to examine how a number of 
imperfect indicators usually available in developing countries compare to a first-best 
measure of fiscal capacity.  This is of interest since economists working in the field of 
fiscal federalism often have to conceive intergovernmental equalisation transfers (IET) 
schemes in countries where the appropriate data required for optimal design is not 
available. This paper follows two prior studies that sought to answer the same question: 
Vaillancourt (2001) and Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004). Our analysis was carried 
out using a World Bank study of local organizations in India which provides us with data 
that both is and is not usually available in developing countries.  
 
In the second part of this paper we will devise an IET scheme for Kosovo using 
recent data on tax assessment as a proxy for fiscal capacity.  Limited data availability had 
prevented ed the country from having a proper IET scheme for a number of years.  
 
 The paper is divided into three sections. We first review the theoretical and 
empirical literature on IET in section 1.  In the second section, we present the data and 
related issues, discuss our methodology and examine the results for the Indian case and 
then conclude.  In the third and last section of this paper, we look at the case of Kosovo.  
We present the data and methodology.  The results are discussed.  Lastly, we conclude 
briefly. 
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1. What are IET ? 
 
Equalisation consists of a system of unconditional redistributive transfers usually 
from the central to sub-national governments (SNGs), hence the name intergovernmental 
equalisation transfers (IET). The main purpose of such transfers is to enable SNGs with 
different revenue raising capabilities (fiscal capacity) and different expenditure needs 
(fiscal needs) to provide comparable levels of public services at comparable revenue 
efforts. In other words, such transfers aim to equalise the net fiscal benefit (NFB) 
received by otherwise-equal individuals in different regions of a single country; where 
NFB equals the amount of public services received minus the amount of taxes paid.  
 
   i i iNFB public services received taxes paid= −  
 
IET are a consequence of decentralisation. That is, IET are needed to replicate the 
fiscal structure of unitary state within a decentralised federation. The question of whether 
IETs are desirable is a matter for societal consensus and subsequent policy choices.  This 
paper will not examine the case for desirability.  Rather, this paper assumes such 
equalisation schemes are desirable.  
 
Since James Buchanan’s influential paper (1950) a significant literature has 
developed on the use of IET to rectify inequities and inefficiencies that may arise within a 
decentralised federation. Indeed, Buchanan and many others3 (Boadway and Flatters, 
Shah) argue that IET constitute a rare occurrence in economics, i.e., it is the case where 
both equity and efficiency concerns coincide.  This section will provide a brief overview 
of this literature4. 
 
Equity 
 
Buchanan’s approach focuses solely on the fiscal capacity of SNGs.  The fiscal 
capacity of a SNG is defined as its ability to raise revenues from its particular tax bases.  
                                                 
3 See Buchanan (1950), Boadway and Flatters (1982), Shah (1994) 
4 See Boadway (2004) for an excellent in-depth review.  
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Regarding equity, IET aim to enable SNGs with different fiscal capacities to provide 
comparable levels of public services at comparable tax rates. In a country with 
heterogeneous regions, SNGs will likely have different fiscal capacities and as a result 
will be unable to offer the same level of public services at the same tax rates.  
Consequently, to ensure that the same level of public services will be available, the 
poorer SNGs must impose greater tax burdens on its citizens.  
 
Buchanan focuses exclusively on the “taxes paid” part of the NFB equation. This 
approach ignores the fact that heterogeneous regions may have inherent characteristics 
that render them unable to provide certain public services at the same costs.  Thus, with 
respect to IET design one must also take into account the public services received part of 
the equation which in practice is assessed by indicators of fiscal needs.  With 
heterogeneous regions, fiscal needs differentials may lie in cost differences or needs 
differences.  That is, differences may exist in the per-unit cost or in the number of units 
needed per capita of a standardised public service.  The former may arise from climatic 
and geographic features or density and distance factors whereas the latter may be due to 
demographic factors such as the age structure of the population or cultural factors such as 
the need to provide public services in multiple languages.  Thus, IET design should be 
predominantly concerned with eliminating differences in NFB provided to otherwise-identical 
individuals living in different regions rather than focusing just on fiscal capacity or fiscal needs.   
 
Efficiency  
 
With respect to efficiency, IET aim to eliminate migration of labour and capital 
induced by regional differences in NFBs induced by decentralisation.  Indeed, economic 
efficiency requires that the geographical distribution of labour and capital be based on 
productivity considerations, not on expected NFB.   
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IET around the world 
Many countries opt for a decentralised structure of governance and attempt to 
implement effective equalisation transfer schemes. For instance, India has used since 
1919 a system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to rectify horizontal and vertical 
inefficiencies between states5.  In India, as it is the case for a number of countries, 
decision-making over intergovernmental transfers is delegated to an independent agency. 
In this case, India’s Finance commission provides formulae-based6 equalisation transfers 
using fiscal capacity, expenditure differential and fiscal effort indices: For the 2000-2005 
period, 62.5 percent is based on income per capita, 10 percent is based on population, 7.5 
percent on area, 7.5 percent on an index of infrastructure, 7.5 percent on “fiscal 
discipline” and 5 percent on tax effort.   Many other countries have opted for equalisation 
schemes (e.g. Brazil, China, Malaysia, and Nigeria). Consider Table A-1 from Bird & 
Vaillancourt (2004). This table shows the importance of IET around the world as well as 
the diversity of equalisation schemes.  However in most developing countries the 
necessary data to compute IET using formulae-based instruments are rather limited or 
simply unavailable.  How can such countries make an optimal design? This is a question 
that we and other researchers seek to answer.  
 
When countries opt for equalisation, efficient formulae and indicators are needed.  
However, in developing countries, it is often the case that the data needed to compute 
such transfers are limited or unavailable.  This has motivated authors (Vaillancourt, 2001 
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2004) to find indicators among the available data that best 
fit the first-best measures of fiscal needs and fiscal capacity. 
 
Vaillancourt’s paper (2001) is a first attempt at examining the way in which 
various indicators typically prevalent in developing countries are correlated to an 
indicator of fiscal capacity. To do so, the author used data from the 1951 and 1961 
censuses and from 1954 taxation data for the two poorest Canadian provinces, 
Newfoundland and Prince-Edward-Island.  According to Vaillancourt, this data can serve 
                                                 
5  See Rao (2004) p.16  
6 See Rao, 2004 
 5
as a reasonable proxy for a middle-income developing country such as Morocco.  Eight 
simple indicators are computed:  
 
Demographic indicators  
- percentage of the population under age 19 attending school  
- percentage of the population with little schooling  
- percentage of rural population 
Housing indicators    
- housing in need of repair  
- wood used for heating fuel 
- wood or coal used for cooking  
- households with no piped water  
Labour market indicator 
- percentage of the population 14 years and older employed  
 
These indicators are computed for each of the thirteen census divisions examined. 
Both the mean and maximum value of a given indicator are used as targets for 
equalisation. As a measure of fit, the author reports the absolute difference between the 
equalisation entitlement obtained for indicator i and the reference point, i.e., an indicator 
of taxable capacity for each SNG; in this case taxable income. Although no indicator is 
clearly more precise than another, indicators of rurality (percentage of rural population, 
percentage with no piped water) perform fairly well. The paper’s main finding is that 
using maximum rather than mean values as equalisation targets yields better results, since 
the need to correctly match transfers equal to zero is reduced.   
 
 Martinez-Vazquez and Boex proposed a similar analysis.  Based on data available for 
Georgia for 1957-1960 they were able to compute a variety of indicators.  
 
Eight measures of local fiscal needs: 
- actual and lagged local expenditures per capita 
- equal per capita expenditure norm 
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- the proportion of poor households  
- the proportion of households without piped water 
- an index of need based on infant mortality  
- an index of expenditure needs based on poverty, water access and infant mortality 
(similar to HDI) 
- a traditional Representative Expenditure System 
- a regression-based Representative Expenditure System 
 
They also provide measures of fiscal capacity:  
- revenue collection and lagged revenue collection per capita 
- poverty as a proxy of fiscal capacity 
- regional income level as a proxy of fiscal capacity  
- average per capita personal income  
- traditional Representative Revenue System 
- regression-based Representative Revenue System 
 
The regression-based Representative Expenditure System (and the regression-based 
RRS) is a data-intensive method based on regression analysis.  It involves regressing 
different expenditure categories on a series of explanatory variables (land area, 
population, age distribution, etc…) in order to obtain equations for every expenditure 
category and every SNG. According to the authors, these are the first-best measures of 
fiscal capacity and fiscal needs.  
 
With respect to fiscal needs, the authors find that the best performing alternative 
measure is the per capita expenditure norm, which is solely allocated in proportion to 
population.  As it was the case for Vaillancourt, composite indices perform fairly poorly. 
With respect to fiscal capacity, all the proposed indicators performed well.   
 
The authors conclude rather tentatively.  First, different methodologies can have a 
great impact on IET design. Second, their analysis shows that the best indicators of fiscal 
needs and fiscal capacity are not necessarily data-intensive. For instance, the per capita 
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expenditure norm is one of the best-performing indicator and its formula relies only on 
two variables.  Finally, the best performing indicators are both the actual expenditures 
and revenue collections per capita. But these do not satisfy an incentives criterion which 
we will discuss later on. 
 
 
2. India 
 
Data 
The data used to perform this analysis came from the World Bank (2001) study of 
the performance of local organizations in India. The study used a mixed methodology 
comprised of traditional extensive data collection based on questionnaires and intensive 
enquiry using interactive methods such as focus groups and various rural appraisal 
instruments. It aimed to assess the performance of local organizations (LO) that provide 
development programs in the three key sectors of watershed development (natural 
resource management), rural water supply and sanitation (basic needs) and rural women 
empowerment and development (social development).  
 
By means of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, data were gathered 
from representatives and staff of LOs implementing such programs; from the villages and 
elected bodies; and from households benefiting from development programs.  The study 
was conducted in the three states of Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttaranchal 
(formerly Uttar Pradesh) although due to missing data only Karnataka is included in our 
analysis.  We will discuss this point later on. 
 
Respondents for the household questionnaire were selected using a stratified 
random sample from a listing of members of sector specific local organizations. These 
organizations were identified during an organizational mapping of each village studied. It 
is important to point out that villages were not selected at random.  Rather, these entities 
were selected based on the prevalence of sector specific LOs operating within their 
territory.  Therefore, it is unclear whether our results are applicable to the general case.  
We discuss this point in the next section. 
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The main issues are twofold. First of all, there is missing or suspicious data for 
some of the variables in the World Bank study.  Second, selection of villages based on 
the prevalence of LOs within their territory could induce a bias.  
 
Because of missing data on revenues and lagged revenues many observations on 
villages had to be dropped. In some cases, the data were suspicious showing great 
variations from year to year.  In other cases, the data showed patterns that raised doubts 
on data collection itself.  Thus, many villages were dropped from the sample.  The 
original dataset contained data on 36 villages in Karnataka. After data cleaning only 28 
villages were available for analysis.  Additionally, there was missing or suspicious data 
for actual and lagged revenue collections and other variables for villages in Uttaranchal 
and Madhya Pradesh.  Because of this limited availability only the state of Karnataka was 
included in the final sample.  
 
Table 1 - Original and Final Sample Size by State 
State Original Sample Size Final Sample Size 
Karnataka 36 28 
Uttaranchal 36 0 
Madhya Pradesh 36 0 
                Source: WB Data on the performance of local organisations 
  
Second, as noted above village selection in the World Bank study based on the 
prevalence of sector specific LOs operating within their territory.  Since villages were not 
selected at random, it is unsure whether our results can be representative of villages 
without important LO activity. However, the similarity of results to those found in prior 
studies lessens this concern.  Nevertheless, the reader should be warned of such a 
possibility.  
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Methodology  
 
 We draw on the above-mentioned studies to compute sixteen indicators; their values 
are reported in table A-2.   
- average total income  (first-best measure) 
- population (distribution based solely on population share)  
- average revenue collections per capita for each village 
- average lagged revenue collections per capita for each village (revenues for 
the preceding year)  
- percentage of poor households 
- percentage of households with a water connection  
- percentage of households where a child was sick in the last six months 
- percentage of households who own a television set 
- percentage of households who own a radio 
- percentage of households who own a wall clock 
- percentage of households who own land 
- percentage of households who own an iron box 
- percentage of households who own sheep and/or goats 
- distance (in meters) from the nearest water source 
- percentage of population that is literate 
 
Revenues and lagged revenues per capita provide information about revenue 
collections for the Gram Panchayat (government body) from 1998 to 2001 for every 
village.  Since revenues and lagged revenues have proved to be successful indicators for 
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, villages for which this data was missing were excluded 
from the analysis. However, this type of indicator is clearly inefficient from an incentives 
stand point. Indeed, should IET be based on such indicators SNGs would clearly be 
inclined to spend more and to minimise tax effort in order to receive more transfers.   
 
As mentioned in the introduction regression-based RRS is argued by Boex and 
Martinez-Vasquez to be the best available measure of fiscal capacity (regression-based 
RES is argued to be the best available measure of fiscal needs). However, it is also the 
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most data-intensive.  Ideally, these regression-based methods should be computed using 
time series data. However, in the World Bank study data on expenditure and revenues 
was only available for three fiscal years, 1998-1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.  Given 
this limited availability, neither RRS nor RES can be obtained by regressing expenditures 
categories on a series of factors such as population and land area.   
 
Method 
 
A transfer pool (1 000 000 R’s) is to be allocated between villages (SNGs) using 
average total income as our first-best indicator.  The formula for a given indicator and 
village i: 
 
1
* *
*
i i
i n
i i
i
TP SharePop ShareDevAllocation
SharePop ShareDev
=
=
∑
 
Where TP stands for transfer pool, SharePopi is for the share of the total 
population for village i and ShareDevi is for the share of the sum of the deviations for 
villages 1…, n from the equalisation target.  The same formula is used to compute the 
allocation of this transfer pool for each of the fifteen remaining indicators. We use both 
the maximum and the mean value of a given indicator as targets for equalisation.  For 
example, to obtain the allocation for village i we first calculate the total population which 
is the sum of the population for all villages. 
28
1
    
i
Total Population population of village i
=
= ∑  
We then obtain the share of this sum for village i 
28
1
  
  
i
i
population of village iSharePop
population of village i
=
=
∑
 
For a given indicator, we then choose an equalisation target - either the mean or the 
maximum value of the indicator – and obtain the deviation from this target for every 
village in the sample.  By definition, when the maximum value is used, one deviation will 
equal zero whereas with the use of the mean value, deviations can be either negative, 
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positive or zero.  Villages for which the observed value of an indicator exceeds its mean – 
with positive deviations - do not receive transfers.  The values of their deviations are set 
to zero.  We then compute the absolute value of the sum of the modified  deviations. 
 
28
1
    
i
Total Deviation deviation for village i
=
= ∑  
 
We then obtain the share of this sum for village I 
 
28
1
  
  
i
i
deviation for village iShareDev
deviation of village i
=
=
∑
 
 
We multiply the amount of the transfer pool by these two shares.  We compute the sum of 
the product of these two shares to ensure that the proportions sum to one.  
 
1
* *
*
i i
i n
i i
i
TP SharePop ShareDevAllocation
SharePop ShareDev
=
=
∑
 
 
Finally, the allocation produced by each indicator is compared with the first-best 
indicator (average total income) by computing the total absolute difference (TAD). We 
also report the sum of squared differences (SSQ) which gives greater weight to 
observations that deviate farther from the equalisation target.  
 
 
 
Table 2 - Allocation of transfer pool for villages A, B and C, $ (example) 
    Village   
  A B C 
First-best indicator 500 000 250 000 250 000 
Other indicator 0 250 000 750 000 
Absolute difference 500 000 0 500 000 
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The TAD is simply the sum of the absolute differences calculated for every 
village in the sample.  The method to calculate the SSQ is straightforward. In this case 
the TAD equals 1 000 000 $ which is a fairly poor performance.  Indicators are ranked 
according to their respective TADs (and SSQs); from the smallest to the largest (the 
smallest being the best performing indicator).    
 
Results 
We report the TAD in the first and third column of table 3.  The indicators are ranked 
according to their respective TADs in the second and fourth column.  The ranks specified 
in parentheses are those computed when SSQ is used as goodness-of-fit measure.  
 
As it was the case in Vaillancourt (2001), for a given indicator using maximum values as 
targets for equalisation rather than mean values yields better fit.  This is due to the fact 
that when using maximum value as a target the need to correctly match transfers equal to 
zero is reduced.  For any given indicator, the TAD reported when mean value was used 
ranged from 2 to 5 times the size of the maximum value TAD.  For example, the TAD for 
the worst fitting indicator (distance from the nearest water source) when mean value is 
used is equal to 1 588 323 $ which is more than twice as large as the maximum value 
TAD, 708 419 $.  The mean value TAD for the best fitting indicator (population) is 
roughly five times larger than the maximum value TAD.   Furthermore, our results show 
that the worst fitting indicator when maximum value is used (distance from the nearest 
water source) still outperforms the best fitting indicator with mean value (percentage of 
poor households) as a target for equalisation.  This suggests that for any given indicator 
maximum value as a target for IET is preferable to mean value.  
 
Population constitutes the best performing indicator when using maximum value 
as a target posting a TAD of 148 818$.  It places fifth using the mean value method.  This 
is of interest since many countries already use such an indicator.  Thus, the data is usually 
readily available at the micro level and by age brackets.  Correcting for age distribution 
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could improve the fit (data on age distribution was not available).  Further studies are 
needed to verify its effectiveness.  
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Table 3 - Total absolute difference (TAD) and Total Sum of Squared Deviations 
(SSQ) using maximum and mean value as targets, rank for fifteen indicators (in 
rupees) 
 
Indicator Max (R’s) 
Rank  
(SSQ)  
Mean  
(R’s) 
Rank  
(SSQ)  
%literate 291 763 5 (5) 1 024 608 9 (8) 
        
%poor 387 188 10 (8) 819 563 1 (1)  
        
%pucca 452 297 13 (14) 1 048 361 11 (12) 
        
%radio 398 776 12 (10) 979 149 6 (5)  
        
%tv 259 298 4 (4) 1 002 148 7 (7)  
        
%wall clock 301 797 6 (6) 1 026 546 10 (11)  
        
%iron box 312 085 7 (7) 844 004 2 (4) 
        
%land 363 639 8 (9) 933 214 3 (9) 
        
%sheep/goat 393 041 11 (12) 1 493 102 14 (14) 
        
% with water 244 441 3 (3) 1 019 741 8 (6) 
        
%child sick 516 495 14 (13) 1 270 263 13 (13) 
        
distance  708 419 15 (15) 1 588 323 15 (15) 
        
revenues 184 267 2 (2) 940 513 4 (3) 
        
lagged revenues 380 441 9 (11) 1 087 696 12 (10) 
        
per capita 148 818 1 (1)  953 164 5 (2) 
                           Source: Tables A-3 and A-4 
 
Average revenue collections per capita constitute the second best performing 
indicator when using maximum value as a target posting a TAD of 184 267 $.  It places 
fourth using the mean value method.  Martinez-Vasquez & Boex found similar results as 
it ranked first. However, as we have already mentioned this indicator does not have an 
efficient incentives structure.  Thus, although effective in theory its use is discouraged in 
practice.  
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Overall, indicators of rurality perform fairly well.  The percentage of households 
with a water connection is the third best performing indicator posting a TAD of 244 
441$. It places eighth when using mean value as a target.  Vaillancourt found similar 
results whereas Martinez-Vasquez & Boex found it to be the worst performing indicator.  
As opposed to average revenues per capita, this indicator satisfies the incentives 
constraint.  Moreover, the data needed for its calculation is fairly easy to collect.  Water 
connections are easier to account for than television sets for example because they cannot 
be easily disposed of or hidden7.  Thus, this indicator satisfies the necessary incentives 
and ease of collection criterions while performing well.  Developing countries looking for 
methods that are not data-intensive should pay attention to such an indicator.  
 
The percentage of households who own a television set performed well posting a 
TAD of 259 298 $. None of the prior studies have examined this indicator.  However as 
we have mentioned already, television sets are relatively easy to hide and thus would 
probably not yield efficient IETs in practice.  
 
Lastly, using the SSQ method did not yield significant changes in the ranking of the 
indicators.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This section of the paper aimed to replicate two prior studies where imperfect 
indicators were used to simulate IETs.  Fifteen indicators were computed and compared 
with a first-best measure of fiscal capacity.  The performance of each indicator was 
established using total absolute difference (TAD) from the first-best equalisation transfer 
entitlement.  As it was the case for Vaillancourt (2001), we find that for a given indicator 
using maximum values as targets for IET rather than mean values yields better fit.  This is 
due to the fact that the need to match transfers equal to zero is reduced.  Furthermore, our 
results show that the worst fitting indicator when maximum value is used still 
                                                 
7 If satellite dishes are used, this may be less of an issue as the need for a clear line of sight makes them 
hard to hide. 
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outperforms the best fitting indicator with mean value as a target for equalisation.  This 
suggests that maximum value as a target for equalisation is always preferable to mean 
value.   Second, population constitutes the best performing indicator when using 
maximum value as a target. Third, as it was the case for Boex & Martinez-Vasquez 
average revenue collections per capita perform well.  However, this indicator does not 
have an efficient incentives structure.  Finally, the percentage of households with a water 
connection is the third best performing indicator and it also satisfies the necessary 
incentives and ease of collection criterions.  Vaillancourt also found this indicator to be 
effective.  As a result, developing countries looking to devise IET schemes that are not 
data-intensive should pay attention to such an indicator.   However, further studies are 
needed to clearly confirm its effectiveness.  
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3. An IET scheme for Kosovo 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the second part of this paper is to design an IET scheme for 
Kosovo. Since the end of the tragic events that took place in the late 1990’s Kosovo has 
been ruled by a bifurcated central government comprised of the UNMIK (United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo) and of the PISG (Provisional Institutions of Self Government) with 
an assembly, a president and a ministerial council.  However, due to limited data 
availability the country still lacks a proper IET scheme.  Using methods which were 
tested in the first part of this paper, four schemes will be devised. We will report and 
discuss differences in per capita allocations for a selection of municipalities.    
 
 
Data 
  
The data on tax assessment and other demographic characteristics was obtained as 
a by-product from work by François Vaillancourt on Kosovo Decentralisation  for the 
UNDP8.  Although data on tax assessment was available for 2004, 2005 and 2006 we 
only used 2005.  Data on actual grants received came from the 2006 Kosovo Budget.  
Finally, data on majority and minority profiles was provided by the Statistical Office of 
Kosovo but was only available for 1991.  From the 30 municipalities in the original 
dataset only 27 remain due to missing data.  The municipalities that were excluded are 
Leposaviç, Zveçan and Zubin-Potok; these are Serbian municipalities that do not provide 
data to the relevant central agencies .  The municipality of Fushe Kosove was also 
excluded because it is a significant outlier with respect to fiscal capacity.  Indeed the 
municipality posts a 26.34 Euros tax assessment per capita which lies at roughly four 
standard deviations from a mean of 5.77.  Thus, the final sample is comprised of 26 
municipalities; the data re found in table A-5.  
 
                                                 
8 Data compiled by Luan Bicaj  from multiple public sources such as Association of  Kosovo 
Municipalities 2005 and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Municipal Profiles 2005 and 
provided by François Vaillancourt..,. 
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The population data used to perform this analysis was derived from information 
on population figures available to the UNMIK Department of Local Administration 
(DLA) and the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) as of the 8th of August 2001. The last 
valid Census was conducted in 1981; the Albanian majority boycotted the 1991 Census. 
The population of Kosovo adds up to a little more than 2 million people and is composed 
of 85-90% Albanians, 5-8% Serbs and other small minorities such as Romas, Turks, etc. 
 
The 2001 population data is often contested by municipalities who claim that their 
population has now increased. This is probably true; however the important issue is the 
relative population size since the absolute size of the population does not affect the 
allocation of grants. So, “in this respect, it is plausible that internal migration since 2001 
will have increased the population share of municipalities with greater economic activity 
such as Prishtine or Prizen. This means that using the 2001 population implicitly 
equalises for fiscal potential since Prishtine which has greater local tax potential than 
poorer municipalities receives less per capita than it should while the others receive 
more.”9.   
 
 
 Methodology 
 
The municipalities of Kosovo constitute sub-national government (SNGs) bodies 
which were the focus point of the first part of this paper. In 2006, the main source of 
municipal revenues is central government grants, which represent 79.6 % of total 
revenues with municipal own source revenues (MOSR) making up 20.4 %.  
 
The actual setting of transfers to SNGs as a share of Kosovo generated revenues 
began in 2001-2002. This share of forecast central budget revenues was established at 
around 22% for 2005. This proportion is historically related to the needs of the 
municipalities. It is divided into four specific grants: 
 
                                                 
9 See Vaillancourt (2006) 
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The Education Grant:  The amount of this grant awarded to the 26 municipalities studied 
here was 73 132 291 Euros in 200510. 
The Health Grant:  The amount of this grant was 17 184 438 Euros for the 26 
municipalitie) in 2005. 
Additionally, there is a General Grant of 36 365 264 Euros  for the 26 municipalities and 
a Property Tax Collection Incentive Grant. 
 
This part of the paper will consider the sum of the Education, Health and General 
Grants which constitutes a total transfer pool of 125 681 993 Euros (excluding the 
Property Tax Grant).  
 
Current Methods11 
 
The allocation of the Education Grant uses a formula developed by the World 
Bank which allocates transfers to majority and minority populations on the basis of 
pupil/teacher ratios and a variety of other factors12.  As for the allocation of the Health 
Grant it is based solely on the 2001 population data.  Finally, the General Grant is the 
difference between the sum of these previous grants and the total transfer pool which is 
set at 22% of forecast central government revenue. The General Grant is comprised of 
two parts, a fixed amount of 100,000 Euros per municipality and the remainder divided 
according to the 2001 population data.  
 
Revised Methods  
 
To compute the revised methods we will make use of both shares and deviations.  
Using shares to simulate transfers is straightforward.  For example, a municipality with a 
relatively greater population size would receive a proportional transfers – a larger slice of 
the pie.  Using deviations requires a different approach which was laid out in the first part 
of the paper. 
                                                 
10 This in a sense  assumes that the formula applied to the 30 municipalities would yield this amount for the 
26;thsis debatable but is the simplest assumption that can be used here. 
11 See Vaillancourt (2006) 
12 See the annex for the complete method 
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First, we simulate a scheme based solely on population.  Formally, 
1)  
1
1.00 ii n
i
i
PopGrant TP
Pop
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
 
where Granti is the total grant to municipality i, TP stands for transfer pool (125 681 993 
Euros in our case), Popi represents the total population of municipality. 
 
This and the current Kosovar scheme ignore fiscal capacity. Thus we propose an 
IET scheme based on Germany’s revenue sharing formula13 which accounts for 
differences in fiscal capacity.  In this case 75 percent of the transfer pool is distributed on 
a per capita basis.  The remaining 25 percent is allocated to municipalities with below-
average fiscal capacity.  For the purpose of our analysis, tax assessment per capita is used 
as a proxy for fiscal capacity.   Formally, 
2)  
1 1
0.75 0.25i i ii n n
i i i
i i
Pop DevCap PopShareGrant TP TP
Pop DevCap PopShare
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
 
 DevCapi is the deviation from the average tax assessment per capita PopSharei is the 
share of the total population for municipality i.  This method is the same as in the first 
part of this paper.  Remember that deviations for villages with above-average fiscal 
capacity are set to zero.  The German approach was chosen because it has been shown to 
be significantly equalising14,15 while having minimal data requirements.  
 
Third we use population, land area and number of villages to allocate the transfer 
pool.  Formally,  
                                                 
13 See Ma (1997) pp. 12-14 
14 See Vaillancourt & Bird (2004) p.15 
15 See Ma (1997) p.14 
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                         3)  
1 1 1
0.75 0.125 0.125i i ii n n n
i i i
i i i
Pop LA NbVilGrant
Pop LA NbVil
= = =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑
 
where LAi is land area and NbVili is the number of villages in municipality i.  The fact 
that the percentages attributed to population are the same in method 2 and 3 will enable 
us to better compare the allocation of the transfer pool.  The main advantage of this 
method is that the data needed for its computation can be easily obtained.  Moreover, it 
requires minimal monitoring by the central government of data collection carried out by 
SNGs.  
 
Fourth we compute an IET scheme which accounts for population, fiscal capacity 
and fiscal needs.    
 
4) 
1 1 1 1
0.50 0.125 0.125 0.25i i i i ii n n n n
i i i i i
i i i i
Pop LA NbVil DevCap PopShareGrant
Pop LA NbVil DevCap PopShare
= = = =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
 
Results 
 
Our first method sees the transfer pool allocated using only population16. It yields three 
clear-cut winners, Podujevë, Prishtinë and Prizren respectively posting 7.68 €, 13.76 € 
and 7.41€ per capita increases in grants.  These municipalities are also the most populous 
in Kosovo. Novobërde and Shtërpcë post the greatest decreases with 73.58 € and 58.63 € 
per capita. The total absolute difference (TAD) from the current Kosovar scheme is 
roughly 16 million Euros.  
 
The second method allocates 75 percent of the transfer pool on a per capita basis. 
The remaining 25 percent is distributed using tax assessment per capita as a proxy for 
                                                 
16 See table A-6 to A-9 for the complete results 
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fiscal capacity.  This formula yields four winners Ferizaj, Malishevë, Podujeve and 
Skenderaj.  Each of these municipalities post increases of more than 28 € per capita.  
Prizren and Prishtinë now post decreases of 3.87€, 0.85€ per capita while Novobërde and 
Shtërpcë post decreases of 9.06€ and 65.23€ respectively.  This method yields a TAD of 
about 32 million Euros.   
 
The third method utilises 75 percent population, 12.5 percent land area and 12.5 
percent number of villages as equalisation factors. Prishtinë and Prizren post increases 
and Novobërdë and Shtërpcë post decreases smaller than those in methods 1 and 2.  The 
TAD for this method is approximately 11 million Euros.  
 
Finally, our fourth method is a variation on the third.  It includes equalisation in 
terms of population, fiscal capacity and fiscal needs.   For the first time Prishtinë posts a 
significant decrease whereas Novobërdë posts an increase.   
 
First, we notice that methods that account for differences in fiscal capacity report 
decreases in per capita transfers to Prishtinë and Prizren. Indeed, the tax assessment per 
capita data suggest that the current scheme gives too high  transfers to these 
municipalities. Second, methods 1 to 3 decreased transfers to Novobërdë and Shtërpcë.   
This may be evidence that the current scheme overestimates transfers to these 
municipalities as well.  
 
Of all the methods reviewed in this analysis, the fourth is recommended because it 
accounts for both fiscal capacity and fiscal needs.  Moreover, it is easy to compute and 
the necessary data is fairly easy collect.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the second part of this paper we proposed four IET schemes for Kosovo.  The 
fourth method is recommended because it accounts for both fiscal capacity and fiscal 
needs.  Three out of the four formulas decreased transfers to Novobërdë and Shtërpcë.  
We also notice that methods accounting for differences in fiscal capacity report decreases 
in per capita transfers to Prishtinë and Prizren This consistency suggest than the current 
Kosovar scheme overestimates the needs of these municipalities.  However, it is 
important to remember that our methods did not completely account for fiscal needs 
differentials.  This fact could explain some unexpected results such as the negative 
correlation between a municipality’s share of total minority population and its average 
per capita grant.  A new census is planned for late 2006 or 2007.  This fresh data will 
enable us to better assess the fiscal capacity and fiscal needs of Kosovar municipalities 
and to design an optimal IET scheme which would account for fiscal gap differentials.  
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Table A-1 Intergovernmental Equalisation Transfers in Six Countries  
 
Country Number of Regions 
Number of 
equalisation 
programs  
Distributive pool  
Fiscal 
capacity 
categories 
Expenditures 
differential 
categories 
Fiscal effort
Australia 8 1 Federal VAT 18 (RTS) 41 No 
              
Germany 16 3 Federal VAT 3 (RTS)   - No 
       Horizontal Sharing  3(RTS)   2   
      
Supplementary federal grants 
from general revenue  Variable -   
              
Switzerland 26 3 
Federal conditional grants from 
general revenue  
3 (RTS and 
macro)   2 Yes 
      
FDT, withholding tax custom 
duties (petrol and motor fuel) 
and National Bank's benefit   3 2   
      
Cantonal contributions to social 
security 3 2   
China  31 9 Gap-filling (general revenue)  - - No 
      
Determined ad hoc by the 
central government   13 (RTS)   12   
      Central VAT  13 (RTS) 12   
      General revenue  - 
1 (number of civil 
servants)   
      Other programs       
India 35 3 Total central taxes  
2 (RTS and 
macro) plus 
gap filling    2 Yes 
      General revenue  2 2   
      Specific purpose grants       
Brazil 27 2 
Federal personal and corporate 
income tax and VAT       No 
      For states   - 2   
      For cities - 1   
Source:Bird and Vaillancourt(2004) 
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Table A-2 Final Dataset, 29 villages, Karnataka state, India. 
 
 
Village ID   211111 211121 211131 211141 211151 211211 211221 
            
Income mean 37428 14045 31031 21624 106453 30919 22763,75
            
Literacy rate  %literate 0,4375 0,3125 0,5 0,5 0,375 0,8 0,5625 
            
Poverty  % poor  0,625 0,8125 0,6875 0,625 0,5625 0,625 0,6875 
            
Type of house 
owned %pucca 0 0 0 0,125 0,375 0,25 0,0625 
            
Asset ownership %radio 0,3125 0,1875 0,25 0,5 0,5 0,4375 0,4375 
  %tv 0,3125 0,125 0 0,3125 0,5625 0,3125 0,4375 
  %wall clock 0,5625 0,4375 0,625 0,625 0,8125 0,75 0,5625 
  %iron box  0,0625 0,0625 0,0625 0,1875 0,3125 0,3125 0,0625 
  %land 0,5 0,5 0,5625 0,9375 0,8125 0,9375 0,4375 
  %sheep/goat 0,125 0,25 0,25 0,125 0,0625 0 0,0625 
            
Water connection %yes  0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,375 0,25 
Child 36 months 
or less fell sick %no 0,75 0,875 0,6875 0,6875 0,9375 0,9375 0,8125 
Distance from 
source of water  mean (mtr) 102 33 215 314 9 188 51 
            
            
Total population  20000 9847 6436 7241 5330 3281 10024 
            
            
Total revenues 
for SNG 2000-2001 1274827229141 213716 218551 204304 307170 1479770 
            
  1999-2000 906455 252766 271914 495796 204257 204927 481393 
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Table A-2 continued 
 
Village ID   211231 211241 211251 211311 211321 211331 211341 
            
Income mean 27654 54131 33738 34801 40213 25398 41350 
            
Literacy rate  %literate 0,5 0,75 0,5 0,5625 0,875 0,375 0,5625 
            
Poverty  % poor  0,5 0,4375 0,5625 0,625 0,625 0,8125 0,375 
            
Type of house 
owned %pucca 0,25 0,375 0,4375 0 0,375 0 0,375 
            
Asset ownership %radio 0,4375 0,5625 0,5 0,3125 0,4375 0,125 0,625 
  %tv 0,4375 0,4375 0,5625 0,4375 0,4375 0,25 0,75 
  %wall clock 0,625 0,6875 0,75 0,6875 0,6875 0,6875 0,9375 
  %iron box  0,0625 0,0625 0,375 0,4375 0,375 0 0,625 
  %land 0,5 0,625 0,125 0,4375 0,875 0,5625 0,625 
  %sheep/goat 0,125 0,0625 0 0,125 0,0625 0,0625 0 
            
Water connection %yes  0,4375 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,375 0,25 
Child 36 months 
or less fell sick %no 0,75 0,9375 1 0,75 0,9375 0,8125 0,625 
Distance from 
source of water  mean (mtr) 16 24 28 112 67 58 23 
            
            
Total population  10500 8227 8164 12258 6516 9314 7701 
            
            
Total revenues 
for SNG 2000-2001 598930 475323 482823 919288 643097 568524 279487 
            
  1999-2000 454130 558849 581608 594437 462455 961057 159273 
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Table A-2 continued 
 
Village ID   211351 211362 215121 215131 215141 215151 215162
            
Income mean 58050 39900 25754 42041 29805 29802 35596
            
Literacy rate  %literate 0,75 0,5 0,4375 0,6875 0,375 0,375 0,375
            
Poverty  % poor  0,4375 0,625 0,8125 0,75 0,625 0,5625 0,6875
            
Type of house 
owned %pucca 0,1875 0,125 0,375 0,3125 0,4375 0,1875 0,1875
            
Asset ownership %radio 0,625 0,3125 0,3125 0,4375 0,125 0,25 0,3125
  %tv 0,5 0,375 0,25 0,25 0,1875 0,0625 0,1875
  %wall clock 0,875 0,25 0,5 0,8125 0,3125 0,5625 0,5
  %iron box  0,5 0,25 0,125 0,3125 0,125 0,125 0,125
  %land 0,8125 0,8125 0,4375 0,5625 0,875 0,625 0,625
  %sheep/goat 0 0,0625 0,0625 0 0,0625 0,1875 0,0625
           
Water connection %yes  0,5625 0,5 0,25 0,25 0,3125 0,25 0,25
Child 36 months 
or less fell sick %no 0,875 1 0,625 0,9375 1 0,9375 0,9375
Distance from 
source of water  mean (mtr) 177,13 160,19 72,813 81,688 95,813 32,375 229,75
            
            
Total population  5820 4983 5392 5281 3703 6438 3842
            
            
Total revenues 
for SNG 2000-2001 471519 371118 220271 357927 374989 427992 336447
            
  1999-2000 229991 409641 218973 298837 299653 425531 254091
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Table A-2 continued 
 
Village ID   215231 215262 215321 215331 215341 215351 215362
            
Income mean 32213 23584 44509 56069 46569 34278 54206
            
Literacy rate  %literate 0,5 0,375 0,5625 0,2 0,625 0,2667 0,625
            
Poverty  % poor  0,5 0,8125 0,6875 0,6875 0,375 0,5 0,4375
            
Type of house 
owned %pucca 0,1875 0,25 0,3125 0,25 0,1875 0,125 0,125
            
Asset ownership %radio 0,375 0,125 0,3125 0,3125 0,375 0,375 0,5
  %tv 0,3125 0,3125 0,375 0,4375 0,3125 0,1875 0,375
  %wall clock 0,625 0,5625 0,75 0,8125 0,75 0,625 0,5
  %iron box  0,3125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,3125 0,0625 0,4375
  %land 0,8125 0,4375 0,6875 0,625 0,875 0,75 1
 %sheep/goat 0 0,0625 0,125 0,125 0,0625 0,0625 0,0625
           
Water 
connection %yes  0,25 0,1875 0,25 0,25 0,3125 0,25 0,3125
Child 36 months 
or less fell sick %no 0,8125 0,875 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,875 0,75
Distance from 
source of water  mean (mtr) 80,625 85,625 72,75 30,125 37,375 28,938 32,9375
            
            
Total population  5694 7172 5000 5598 5363 6834 5400
            
            
Total revenues 
for SNG 2000-2001 2617881 688726 395655 443469 289620 539000 237002
            
  1999-2000 442737 509477 361209 540782 344283 129000 284344
Source :Compilation by the author 
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Table A-3 Allocation of transfer pool (1 000 000 R’s) in rupees for fifteen indicators 
using maximum value as a target for equalisation, 29 villages, Karnataka state, India.  
 
    
average 
income %literate %poor %pucca %radio %tv 
%wall 
clock %iron box
Village 1 96 841 115 018 103 053 166 085 118 662 106 247 122 010 130 758
Village 2 63 832 72 809 88 792 81 772 81 793 74 730 80 095 64 379
Village 3 34 051 31 725 41 453 53 446 45 823 58 612 32 719 42 078
Village 4 43 089 35 693 37 310 42 951 17 185 38 467 36 811 36 821
Village 5 0 35 031 20 598 6 323 12 649 12 135 10 839 19 359
Village 6 17 385 3 235 16 906 11 677 11 680 17 430 10 008 11 917
Village 7 58 848 41 176 64 563 71 350 35 684 38 037 61 151 65 536
Village 8 58 041 51 758 27 051 37 369 37 379 39 843 53 379 68 648
Village 9 30 196 13 518 10 598 9 760 9 762 31 218 33 459 53 787
Village 10 41 644 40 243 31 550 0 19 375 18 587 24 902 23 722
Village 11 15 237 11 103 13 928 16 033 12 830 14 359 16 490 7 854
Village 12 61 613 50 353 63 161 101 793 72 728 46 514 49 853 26 714
Village 13 30 278 0 33 575 7 730 23 196 24 725 26 501 18 934
Village 14 52 959 61 216 83 986 77 346 88 418 56 548 37 880 67 660
Village 15 35 170 31 634 0 9 136 0 0 0 0
Village 16 19 761 9 563 7 497 27 618 0 17 667 5 917 8 456
Village 17 23 264 24 563 25 676 29 557 29 565 22 690 55 731 21 719
Village 18 30 524 31 009 48 620 6 397 31 991 32 736 38 376 31 335
Village 19 23 862 13 016 40 817 12 530 18 800 32 062 10 739 19 181
Village 20 19 910 24 338 19 080 0 35 152 25 292 37 650 21 520
Village 21 34 617 42 314 24 880 30 550 45 837 53 744 39 275 37 414
Village 22 19 097 25 251 24 746 18 231 22 795 26 242 27 344 22 328
Village 23 29 654 28 068 14 670 27 020 27 026 30 249 28 947 20 682
Village 24 41 692 47 138 64 671 25 525 68 084 38 100 43 753 41 680
Village 25 21 727 20 539 32 204 11 863 29 666 22 767 15 251 29 057
Village 26 19 786 49 670 36 056 19 923 33 214 21 242 11 384 32 533
Village 27 22 529 17 624 0 25 449 25 455 28 490 16 358 19 479
Village 28 34 601 54 648 17 607 40 537 32 437 46 677 34 742 44 680
Village 29 19 791 17 746 6 956 32 031 12 816 24 589 38 433 11 768
TAD   0 291 763 387 188 452 297 398 776 259 298 301 797 312 085
Rank     5 10 13 12 4 6 7
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Table A-3 continued 
 
    
%land %sheep/goat % with water 
%child 
sick distance revenues
lagged 
revenues population
Village 1 127 080 75 685 110 218 134 909 125 523 101 811 120 357 98 009
Village 2 62 568 0 54 266 33 211 15 482 55 249 79 385 48 255
Village 3 35 782 0 35 468 54 267 89 948 35 289 40 788 31 539
Village 4 5 751 27 402 39 904 61 055 149 998 39 984 26 143 35 484
Village 5 12 700 30 255 29 373 8 988 0 28 874 35 956 26 120
Village 6 2 606 24 832 10 849 5 533 39 846 15 442 13 897 16 078
Village 7 71 654 56 900 55 241 50 712 28 581 40 220 57 507 49 122
Village 8 66 717 39 734 23 146 70 827 4 551 54 355 65 450 51 455
Village 9 39 206 46 699 45 338 13 874 8 320 42 511 30 166 40 316
Village 10 90 779 61 789 44 991 0 10 199 42 042 27 123 40 007
Village 11 8 587 20 458 14 896 27 349 1 149 11 369 18 282 13 246
Village 12 87 623 46 387 67 553 82 685 85 111 60 627 69 724 60 070
Village 13 10 351 36 987 35 909 10 988 25 584 30 242 21 830 31 931
Village 14 51 783 52 870 30 797 47 120 30 831 47 737 0 45 643
Village 15 36 699 58 285 42 439 77 920 6 970 41 920 66 079 37 739
Village 16 13 868 44 049 0 19 629 66 352 28 335 38 538 28 521
Village 17 11 873 28 285 5 492 0 51 072 24 679 10 871 24 419
Village 18 38 543 30 607 29 715 54 557 23 233 29 035 35 091 26 423
Village 19 29 361 39 969 29 103 8 906 25 941 26 609 25 593 25 879
Village 20 5 882 21 020 16 325 0 21 746 17 064 8 574 18 146
Village 21 30 680 12 181 35 479 10 857 10 040 32 546 24 833 31 549
Village 22 18 309 21 809 21 173 6 479 57 548 18 381 14 804 18 828
Village 23 13 567 43 095 31 379 28 806 27 558 0 15 059 27 903
Village 24 51 267 40 711 47 429 24 189 37 150 33 533 23 979 35 146
Village 25 19 856 18 921 27 554 33 727 21 522 24 464 16 091 24 502
Village 26 26 677 21 184 30 850 37 761 7 874 27 383 3 832 27 433
Village 27 8 519 30 442 23 644 36 176 10 187 27 972 21 747 26 281
Village 28 21 712 38 792 37 661 23 049 9 060 33 460 59 923 33 490
Village 29 0 30 652 23 807 36 425 8 628 28 867 28 378 26 463
TAD   363 639 393 041 244 441 516 495 708 419 184 267 380 441 148818,094
Rank    8 10 3 14 15 2 9 1
Source :Calculations by the author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
Table A-4 Allocation of transfer pool (1 000 000 R’s) in rupees for fifteen indicators 
using mean value as a target for equalisation 29 villages ,Karnataka state, India  
 
    
average 
income %literate %poor %pucca %radio %tv 
%wall 
clock %iron box
Village 1 8 189 122 015 28 791 255 924 99 992 45 690 135 075 183 510
Village 2 191 291 161 756 190 354 126 004 154 986 185 587 179 952 90 351
Village 3 36 118 6 035 47 648 82 356 66 738 192 364 6 392 59 054
Village 4 96 035 6 790 10 424 36 677 0 16 542 7 192 14 365
Village 5 0 60 036 0 0 0 0 0 0
Village 6 18 713 0 4 723 0 0 7 495 0 0
Village 7 123 652 0 74 212 89 521 0 0 67 699 91 975
Village 8 87 766 9 845 0 0 0 0 10 429 96 343
Village 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 487
Village 10 27 847 7 655 0 0 0 0 0 0
Village 11 26 023 0 3 891 13 691 0 6 175 18 255 0
Village 12 31 207 0 17 646 156 856 61 285 0 0 0
Village 13 0 0 9 380 0 0 0 0 0
Village 14 94 944 104 911 180 051 119 184 196 612 72 699 0 118 952
Village 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Village 16 0 0 0 6 982 0 0 0 0
Village 17 0 4 672 7 173 25 240 24 913 0 177 178 0
Village 18 53 402 32 895 104 234 0 26 958 42 086 67 477 30 086
Village 19 0 0 70 593 0 0 41 220 0 0
Village 20 24 474 41 710 5 331 0 78 168 49 347 110 334 20 662
Village 21 42 566 72 516 0 7 723 66 759 156 880 43 481 35 922
Village 22 7 297 43 276 28 444 4 609 19 208 51 199 48 080 21 437
Village 23 26 484 5 339 0 6 831 0 13 008 5 655 0
Village 24 83 688 80 784 138 643 0 151 396 16 384 48 438 40 018
Village 25 0 0 37 017 0 24 998 0 0 27 898
Village 26 0 143 983 41 444 0 27 988 0 0 31 235
Village 27 0 0 0 6 434 0 12 252 0 0
Village 28 20 306 138 137 0 34 615 0 91 071 6 787 62 705
Village 29 0 0 0 27 352 0 0 67 577 0
TAD    0 1 024 608 819 563 1 048 361 979 149 1 002 148 1 026 546 844 004
Rank     9 1 11 6 7 10 2
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Table A-4 continued 
    
%land % sheep/ goat 
% with 
water %child sick distance revenues 
lagged 
revenues population
Village 1 147 194 0 119 579 148 229 66 018 93 149 126 844 98 009
Village 2 72 471 0 58 875 0 0 140 403 159 837 48 255
Village 3 28 804 0 38 481 86 125 167 499 76 597 50 774 31 539
Village 4 0 0 43 294 96 898 332 475 91 371 0 35 484
Village 5 0 18 979 31 868 0 0 56 954 52 580 26 120
Village 6 0 60 083 0 0 67 655 0 0 16 078
Village 7 102 685 35 693 59 933 14 446 0 0 49 949 49 122
Village 8 77 277 0 0 77 820 0 65 593 77 543 51 455
Village 9 13 091 29 294 49 189 0 0 49 959 0 40 316
Village 10 201 364 149 502 48 812 0 0 46 934 0 40 007
Village 11 0 49 498 16 161 52 309 0 0 26 896 13 246
Village 12 125 570 0 73 290 90 850 64 598 24 366 58 183 60 070
Village 13 0 23 202 38 959 0 0 0 0 31 931
Village 14 41 685 33 165 0 13 423 0 49 349 0 45 643
Village 15 12 254 141 024 46 044 149 031 0 86 014 144 329 37 739
Village 16 0 106 578 0 0 107 236 3 254 53 914 28 521
Village 17 0 17 743 0 0 74 879 10 518 0 24 419
Village 18 55 235 19 200 32 239 104 347 0 54 392 46 982 26 423
Village 19 23 635 96 708 31 575 0 0 19 541 3 559 25 879
Village 20 0 13 185 0 0 7 811 0 0 18 146
Village 21 10 245 0 38 493 0 0 25 804 0 31 549
Village 22 6 114 13 680 22 971 0 111 361 0 0 18 828
Village 23 0 104 271 34 044 8 206 0 0 0 27 903
Village 24 73 469 25 538 111 968 0 468 0 0 35 146
Village 25 0 0 29 895 37 057 0 5 033 0 24 502
Village 26 8 908 0 33 470 41 489 0 5 518 0 27 433
Village 27 0 19 096 0 39 748 0 37 367 0 26 281
Village 28 0 24 334 40 860 0 0 7 302 134 291 33 490
Village 29 0 19 228 0 40 022 0 50 582 14 320 26 463
TAD    933 214 1 493 102 1 019 741 1 270 263 1 588 323 940 513 1 087 696  
Rank   3 14 8 13 15 4 12 5
Source :Calculations by the author 
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Table A-5 Original Dataset, 29 municipalities, Kosovo. 
MUNICIPALITY 
Total Tax 
Assessment 
2005 
Tax 
Assessment 
Per Capita 
Population Size in Square Km
Density per 
Square Km 
Number of 
Villages %Majority
DEÇAN € 204 877 € 4,10 50000 180 277,78 42 97,28%
DRAGASH € 127 692 € 3,65 35000 434 80,65 37 57,78%
FERIZAJ € 237 061 € 2,14 111000 345 322,01 44 88,10%
FUSHE KOSOVE € 940 323 € 26,87 35000 96 364,58 15 56,63%
GJAKOVË € 740 620 € 6,44 115000 521 220,73 84 92,85%
GJILAN € 941 126 € 8,56 110000 515 213,59 63 76,54%
GLLOGOVC € 167 834 € 2,80 60000 290 206,90 36 99,90%
ISTOGU € 137 735 € 3,13 44000 454 96,92 51 76,68%
KAMENICË € 231 078 € 4,20 55000 523 105,16 76 73,05%
KAÇANIK € 156 438 € 3,64 43000 306 140,52 40 98,31%
KLINA € 182 520 € 4,15 44000 308 142,86 54 82,75%
LIPJAN € 293 734 € 3,92 75000 422 177,73 71 77,36%
MALISHEVË € 111 513 € 2,14 52000 306 169,93 44 98,96%
MITROVICA € 415 985 € 3,78 110000 350 314,29 44 78,98%
NOVO BËRDË € 5 700 € 1,14 5000 92 54,35 15 40,03%
OBILIQ € 181 718 € 6,99 26000 105 247,62 20 66,31%
PEJA € 603 800 € 5,25 115000 603 190,71 97 75,46%
PODUJEVE € 237 271 € 2,03 117000 602 194,35 78 97,91%
PRISHTINE € 4 645 959 € 11,61 400000 854 468,38 48 77,63%
PRIZREN € 884 205 € 4,02 220000 640 343,75 73 75,91%
RAHOVEC € 217 939 € 3,46 63000 276 228,26 35 91,91%
SHTËRPCË € 42 255 € 3,84 11000 248 44,35 16 33,83%
SHTIME € 78 809 € 2,81 28000 134 208,96 22 92,38%
SKENDERAJ € 110 263 € 1,97 56000 375 149,33 52 98,14%
SUHAREKE € 260 744 € 3,26 80000 361 221,61 41 94,89%
VITI € 286 406 € 5,62 51000 300 170,00 43 78,68%
VUSHTRRI € 236 008 € 3,15 75000 344 218,02 66 88,48%
           
Zvecan    16000 104 153,85 35   
Leposavic    19000 536 35,45 72   
Zubin Potok    15000 335 44,78 64   
           
Total € 12 679 613   2236000 10959 5807 1478   
Source :data provided by François Vaillancourt 
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Table A-6 Actual and revised grants using 100 percent population, 26 municipalities, 
Kosovo. (Method 1)  
 
Municipality Revised Grant 
Actual 
Grant Difference
Difference 
Per Capita
DEÇAN 2 921 478 2 992 808 -71 330 -1,43
DRAGASH 2 045 035 2 583 248 -538 213 -15,38
FERIZAJ 6 485 682 6 981 115 -495 433 -4,46
GJAKOVË 6 719 400 6 836 139 -116 739 -1,02
GJILAN 6 427 252 7 314 589 -887 337 -8,07
GLLOGOVC 3 505 774 3 988 124 -482 350 -8,04
ISTOG 2 570 901 2 814 898 -243 997 -5,55
KAMENICË 3 213 626 3 560 597 -346 971 -6,31
KAÇANIK 2 512 471 2 555 704 -43 233 -1,01
KLINË 2 570 901 2 917 054 -346 153 -7,87
LIPJAN 4 382 217 4 555 984 -173 767 -2,32
MALISHEVË 3 038 337 3 540 395 -502 058 -9,65
MITROVICA 6 427 252 7 346 002 -918 750 -8,35
NOVOBËRDË 292 148 660 028 -367 880 -73,58
OBILIQ 1 519 169 2 043 107 -523 938 -20,15
PEJË 6 719 400 6 773 239 -53 839 -0,47
PODUJEVE 6 836 259 5 937 433 898 826 7,68
PRISHTINE 23 371 826 17 867 639 5 504 187 13,76
PRIZREN 12 854 504 11 224 654 1 629 850 7,41
RAHOVEC 3 681 063 3 657 894 23 169 0,37
SHTËRPCË 642 725 1 287 614 -644 889 -58,63
SHTIME 1 636 028 1 746 391 -110 363 -3,94
SKENDERAJ 3 272 056 3 615 622 -343 566 -6,14
SUHAREKE 4 674 365 4 836 186 -161 821 -2,02
VITI 2 979 908 3 503 805 -523 897 -10,27
VUSHTRRI 4 382 217 4 541 724 -159 507 -2,13
Source :Calculations by the author 
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Table A-7 Actual and revised grants using 75 percent population and 25 percent tax 
assessment per capita. 26 municipalities, Kosovo. (Method 2)  
  
Municipality Revised Grant 
Actual 
Grant Difference
Difference 
Per Capita
DEÇAN 2 254 241 2 992 808 -738 567 -14,77
DRAGASH 1 991 864 2 583 248 -591 384 -16,90
FERIZAJ 10 737 330 6 981 115 3 756 215 33,84
GJAKOVË 5 039 550 6 836 139 -1 796 589 -15,62
GJILAN 4 820 439 7 314 589 -2 494 150 -22,67
GLLOGOVC 4 759 005 3 988 124 770 881 12,85
ISTOG 3 104 083 2 814 898 289 185 6,57
KAMENICË 2 410 220 3 560 597 -1 150 377 -20,92
KAÇANIK 2 458 750 2 555 704 -96 954 -2,25
KLINË 1 925 071 2 917 054 -991 983 -22,55
LIPJAN 3 738 909 4 555 984 -817 075 -10,89
MALISHEVË 5 018 059 3 540 395 1 477 664 28,42
MITROVICA 5 874 013 7 346 002 -1 471 989 -13,38
NOVOBËRDË 614 726 660 028 -45 302 -9,06
OBILIQ 1 139 377 2 043 107 -903 730 -34,76
PEJË 5 039 550 6 773 239 -1 733 689 -15,08
PODUJEVE 11 649 543 5 937 433 5 712 110 48,82
PRISHTINE 17 528 869 17 867 639 -338 770 -0,85
PRIZREN 10 372 885 11 224 654 -851 769 -3,87
RAHOVEC 3 898 809 3 657 894 240 915 3,82
SHTËRPCË 570 118 1 287 614 -717 496 -65,23
SHTIME 2 208 062 1 746 391 461 671 16,49
SKENDERAJ 5 662 794 3 615 622 2 047 172 36,56
SUHAREKE 5 372 189 4 836 186 536 003 6,70
VITI 2 234 931 3 503 805 -1 268 874 -24,88
VUSHTRRI 5 258 606 4 541 724 716 882 9,56
Source :Calculations by the author 
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Table A-8 Actual and revised grants using 75 percent population, 12.5 percent land area 
and 12.5 percent for the number of villages. 26 municipalities, Kosovo.  (Method 3)  
 
Municipality Revised Grant 
Actual 
Grant Difference
Difference 
Per Capita
DEÇAN 2 987 809 2 992 808 -4 999 -0,10
DRAGASH 2 673 251 2 583 248 90 003 2,57
FERIZAJ 5 946 983 6 981 115 -1 034 132 -9,32
GJAKOVË 6 888 759 6 836 139 52 620 0,46
GJILAN 6 404 762 7 314 589 -909 827 -8,27
GLLOGOVC 3 527 849 3 988 124 -460 275 -7,67
ISTOG 3 269 662 2 814 898 454 764 10,34
KAMENICË 4 165 329 3 560 597 604 732 11,00
KAÇANIK 2 856 932 2 555 704 301 228 7,01
KLINË 3 074 167 2 917 054 157 113 3,57
LIPJAN 4 820 499 4 555 984 264 515 3,53
MALISHEVË 3 299 970 3 540 395 -240 425 -4,62
MITROVICA 5 911 566 7 346 002 -1 434 436 -13,04
NOVOBËRDË 547 681 660 028 -112 347 -22,47
OBILIQ 1 549 400 2 043 107 -493 707 -18,99
PEJË 7 177 121 6 773 239 403 882 3,51
PODUJEVE 7 032 143 5 937 433 1 094 710 9,36
PRISHTINE 19 469 424 17 867 639 1 601 785 4,00
PRIZREN 11 545 406 11 224 654 320 752 1,46
RAHOVEC 3 624 911 3 657 894 -32 983 -0,52
SHTËRPCË 1 070 637 1 287 614 -216 977 -19,73
SHTIME 1 707 441 1 746 391 -38 950 -1,39
SKENDERAJ 3 682 168 3 615 622 66 546 1,19
SUHAREKE 4 577 900 4 836 186 -258 286 -3,23
VITI 3 234 455 3 503 805 -269 350 -5,28
VUSHTRRI 4 635 769 4 541 724 94 045 1,25
Source :Calculations by the author 
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Table A-9 Actual and revised grants using 50 percent population, 12.5 percent land area, 
12.5 percent for the number of villages and 25 percent fiscal capacity. 26 municipalities, 
Kosovo.  (Method 4) 
 
Municipality Revised Grant 
Actual 
Grant Difference
Difference 
Per Capita
DEÇAN 2 320 572 2 992 808 -672 236 -13,44
DRAGASH 2 620 080 2 583 248 36 832 1,05
FERIZAJ 10 198 632 6 981 115 3 217 517 28,99
GJAKOVË 5 208 909 6 836 139 -1 627 230 -14,15
GJILAN 4 797 949 7 314 589 -2 516 640 -22,88
GLLOGOVC 4 781 079 3 988 124 792 955 13,22
ISTOG 3 802 845 2 814 898 987 947 22,45
KAMENICË 3 361 922 3 560 597 -198 675 -3,61
KAÇANIK 2 803 211 2 555 704 247 507 5,76
KLINË 2 428 337 2 917 054 -488 717 -11,11
LIPJAN 4 177 190 4 555 984 -378 794 -5,05
MALISHEVË 5 279 692 3 540 395 1 739 297 33,45
MITROVICA 5 358 327 7 346 002 -1 987 675 -18,07
NOVOBËRDË 870 259 660 028 210 231 42,05
OBILIQ 1 169 608 2 043 107 -873 499 -33,60
PEJË 5 497 271 6 773 239 -1 275 968 -11,10
PODUJEVE 11 845 427 5 937 433 5 907 994 50,50
PRISHTINE 13 626 467 17 867 639 -4 241 172 -10,60
PRIZREN 9 063 787 11 224 654 -2 160 867 -9,82
RAHOVEC 3 842 658 3 657 894 184 764 2,93
SHTËRPCË 998 030 1 287 614 -289 584 -26,33
SHTIME 2 279 475 1 746 391 533 084 19,04
SKENDERAJ 6 072 906 3 615 622 2 457 284 43,88
SUHAREKE 5 275 723 4 836 186 439 537 5,49
VITI 2 489 478 3 503 805 -1 014 327 -19,89
VUSHTRRI 5 512 157 4 541 724 970 433 12,94
Source :Calculations by the author 
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The Education Grant 17  
 
The Education Grant uses a formula developed by the World Bank that was first 
applied in 2004, which allocates funding towards majority and minority populations on 
the basis of pupil/teacher ratios of 21.3 for majority pupils and 14.2 for minority pupils. 
• The formula utilized is as follows: 
o The number of minority and majority pupils in a municipality, - which 
should be obtained from official Directorate of Education reports to the 
MEST  (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology), - are separately 
divided by the pupil/teacher ratio for that population type18. The resulting 
number of teachers is then multiplied times the Kosovo-wide average 
salary per teacher from payroll records. 
 Pupil/teacher ratios are set by the World Bank formula at 1 to 21.3 
for majority pupils and 1 to 14.2 for minority pupils. 
 Formulae are: 
No. Majority Teachers (NMAT) = No. Majority Pupils (NMAP) / 21.3 (Rounded Up) 
No. Minority Teachers (NMIT) = No. Minority Pupils (NMIP) / 14.2 (Rounded Up) 
Teacher Cost Need (TCN) = (NMAT+NMIT) x Kosovo-wide Average Salary of Teacher  
o The number of administrative and support staff, as reported at thetimeof 
budget formulation, multiplied by the average salary per administrative 
and support employee from payroll records. This number, when added to 
the above, gives the total Wage Bill. 
 Formulae are: 
Support Staff Cost Need (SSCN) = No. Admin & Support Staff 2004 x Kosovo-wide 
Average Salary of Staff  
Wage Bill (WB) = TCN + SSCN = WB 
o Good and Services: a fixed amount per school (500 Euro for each pre-
primary and primary school, 1,000 per secondary school) is added to a 
fixed amount per student differentiated by majority and minority students. 
                                                 
17 See Vaillancourt (2006) pp.16-17 
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 Fixed amounts per student for goods and services are set by the 
World Bank formula at €18 per Albanian student and €22.5 per 
student of other ethnic background. 
 The formula is: 
Goods & Services (GS) = (NMAP x 18) + (NMIP x 22.5) = GS 
o Capital Outlays: €5 per student is allocated to the municipality.  
 The formula is: 
Capital Outlays (CO) = (NMAP + NMIP) x 5 = CO 
o Master Formula Calculations:  
Estimated Education Need (EEN) = WB + GS + CO = EEN  
EEN / Combined Total of All Municipalities’ EEN = Percentage of Available Education 
Grant Funding to that municipality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40
3. References 
 
Bird, R. and Tarasov, A. (2002) “Closing the Gap: Fiscal Imbalances and 
Intergovernmental Transfer in Developed Federations”, International Studies Program, 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, March.  
 
Boadway, Robin and F. Flatters (1982) “Efficiency and Equalisation Payments in 
Federal System of Governements, Canadian Journal of Economics 15, 613-633. 
 
Boadway, Robin (2004) “The Theory and Practice of Equalisation”, Department of 
Economics, Queen’s University, WP#1016. 
 
Boex, Jamie and Martinez-Vasquez, J.(2004),“Designing Intergovernmental 
Equalisation Transfers with Imperfect Data : Concepts, Practices and Lessons” , 
Georgia State University.  
 
Bernd Spahn, Paul. (2004) “Intergovernmental Transfers: The Funding Rule and 
Mechanisms”, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 
Georgia State University, WP # 04-17. 
 
Buchanan, James M. (1950) “Federalism and Fiscal Equity”, American Economic 
Review, # 40-4, 583-599. 
 
Day, Kathleen and Winer, Stanley L. (2005) “Policy-Induced Internal Migration: An 
Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case”, CESifo, November, WP#1605. 
 
Kehmani, Stuti (2004) “The Political Economy of Equalisation Transfers”, International 
Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, WP 
# 04-13. 
 
Ma, Jun (1997) “Intergovernmental Fiscal in Nine Countries: Lessons for Developing 
Countries”, World Bank, Economic Development Institute, WP# 1822.  
 
Rao, Govinda (2004), “Changing Contours in Fiscal Federalism in India”, International 
Symposium on Fiscal Decentralization in Asia Revisited, Hitotsubashi University, 
Tokyo, February.  
 
Shah, Anwar (1994)  “A Fiscal Needs Approach to Equalisation Transfers in 
Decentralized Federations”, World Bank, Policy Research Department, Public 
Economics Division, WP #1289. 
 
Vaillancourt, François (2001), “Simulating Intergovernmental Equalisation Transfers 
With Imperfect Data”, National Tax Association Paper and Proceedings, pp. 57-63.  
 
 41
Vaillancourt, F. and Bird, R. (2004), “Expenditure-based equalisation transfers”, 
International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, November, WP # 04-10. 
 
Vaillancourt, François (2006), “Fiscal Decentralisation in Kosovo”, prepared for UNDP, 
July.  
 
Statistical Office of Kosovo (200X), “Kosovo and its Population”. 
 
 
 
 
